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SUBJECT: The City of Buffalo, NY, Did Not Administer Its Community Development Block 
Grant-Recovery Act Program Funds in Accordance With HUD Requirements
HIGHLIGHTS
What We Audited and Why
We audited the City of Buffalo’s administration of its supplemental Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) program fiinded under the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. We selected the City based on concerns 
identified in our completed audit report of the City’s CDBG program.1 The 
objectives of the audit were to determine whether the City efficiently and 
effectively administered its CDBG-Recovery Act (CDBG-R) program in 
compliance with Recovery Act and other applicable requirements. Specifically, 
we wanted to determine whether City officials had adequate policies and 
procedures to ensure that (1) progr am fluids drawn from HUD’s Line of Credit 
Control System were supported with adequate documentation and (2) CDBG-R 
program expenditures were for eligible activities that met a national objective of 
the program.
1 Audit Report Number 2011-NY-1010. issued April 15. 2011
What We Found
City officials did not always administer the CDBG-R program in accordance with 
applicable rules and regulations. Specifically, City officials (1) disbursed CDBG-R 
program funds for questionable street repaving and curb and sidewalk replacement 
expenditures and (2) failed to administer the City’s housing rehabilitation loan 
program in accordance with its own procedures and subcontractor agreement. As a 
result, program funds were used for unsupported capital improvements and 
emergency rehabilitation loan expenditures. Consequently, City officials could not 
assure HUD that all CDBG-R disbursements complied with HUD rules and 
regulations and that the program’s objectives were met.
What We Recommend
We recommend that the Dir ector of HUD’s Buffalo Office of Community 
Planning and Development instruct City officials to (1) provide documentation to 
justify the more than $1.5 million in unsupported costs for questionable CDBG-R 
and fiscal year 2010 CDBG street repaving and curb and sidewalk replacement 
expenditures; (2) reprogram the remaining $159,388 in obligated and unobligated 
street repaving and curb and sidewalk replacement project funds if there is a lack 
of capacity, to ensure that these funds are put to better use for other eligible 
program activities; (3) provide documentation to justify the $249,312 in 
unsupported costs for housing rehabilitation repairs, and (4) suspend incurring 
costs for CDBG-R capital improvement activities until HUD determines whether 
City officials have the capacity to complete these activities in compliance with 
HUD regulations.
For each recommendation in the body of the r eport without a management 
decision, please respond and pr ovide status reports in accordance with HUD 
Handbook 2000.06, REV-4. Please furnish us copies of any correspondence or 
dir ectives issued because of the audit.
Auditee’s Response
We discussed the results of the review dming the audit, pr ovided a copy of the 
draft report to City officials, and requested their comments on November 2, 2011. 
We held an exit conference on November 9, 2011, and City officials provided 
their- written comments on November 15, 2011, at which time they generally 
disagr eed with the findings. The complete text of the auditee’s response, along 
with our evaluation of that response, can be found in appendix B of this report.
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BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES
The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program was established by Title I of the 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Public Law 93-383 as amended. 42 U.S.C. 
(United States Code) 5301. The program provides grants to State and local governments to aid 
in the development of viable urban communities. Governments are to use giant hinds to provide 
decent housing and suitable living environments and expand economic opportunities, principally 
for persons of low and moderate income. To be eligible for funding, every CDBG-funded 
activity must meet one of the progr am’s three national objectives. Specifically, every activity, 
except for progr am administration and planning, must
• Benefit low- and moderate-income persons,
• Aid in preventing or eliminating slums or blight, or
• Addr ess a need with a particular urgency because existing conditions pose a serious and 
immediate threat to the health or welfare of the community.
The City of Buffalo, NY, is a CDBG entitlement gr antee. The U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) awarded the City more than $15.8 million in CDBG funding in fiscal 
year 2008, more than $16 million in 2009, and more than $17 million in 2010.2 These funds are 
available to support a variety of activities directed at improving the physical condition of 
neighborhoods by providing housing rehabilitation, providing public improvements, fostering 
economic development by providing technical and financial assistance to local businesses, 
creating employment, or improving services for low- and moderate-income households. The 
City operates under a mayor-council form of government, and its CDBG activities are 
administered through the Buffalo Urban Renewal Agency and the City’s Office of Strategic 
Planning.
On February 17, 2009, President Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009. The piupose of the Recovery Act was to stimulate the Nation’s ailing economy, with a 
primary focus on creating and saving jobs in the near term and investing in infrastructure that 
will provide long-term economic benefits. This legislation included a $1 billion appropriation of 
community development funds to carry out CDBG programs.
On August 14, 2009, the City received more than $4.3 million in supplemental CDBG funds 
under the Recovery Act (CDBG-R). City officials planned to use the CDBG-R funds on the 
following seven activities:
2 The City's Community Development Block Grant Program fiscal year is May 1 through April 30.
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Activity Amount
obligated
Street and sidewalk improvements - citywide $1,000,000
Sheet and sidewalk improvements - neighborhood 
revitalization strategy area 500,000
Emergency rehabilitation repairs - single family 677,672
Emergency rehabilitation repairs - multifamily 677,673
Jobs training program 531,149
Demolitions - citywide 525,000
General administration 400,000
Total $4,311,494
The objectives of the audit were to determine whether the City efficiently and effectively 
administered its CDBG-R progr am in compliance with the Recoveiy Act and other applicable 
requirements. Specifically, we wanted to deteimine whether City officials had adequate policies 
and procedures to ensure that (1) progr am funds drawn from HUD’s Line of Credit Control 
System were supported with adequate documentation and (2) CDBG-R program expenditures 
were for eligible activities that met a national objective of the program.
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RESULTS OF AUDIT
Finding 1: City Officials Charged Questionable Expenditures to the 
City’s Supplemental CDBG-R Program
City officials charged questionable street repaving and curb and sidewalk replacement costs to its 
supplemental CDBG-R program. Specifically, they did not perform independent cost estimates 
for sealed bid contracts and did not prepare cost or price analyses for modifications to the street 
repaving contract. Further, the City’s administrator, the Buffalo Urban Renewal Agency, did not 
oversee the day-to-day operations of the contractors selected to perform these two capital 
improvement projects. Consequently, there was no assurance that only necessary and reasonable 
costs were charged to the CDBG-R program. We attribute this deficiency to the lack of 
knowledge of HUD regulations by City Department of Public Works staff responsible for the 
procurement of CDBG-R-fimded capital improvement projects, and the Agency’s procedures, 
which did not require its personnel to perform contract oversight for CDBG-R-fimded capital 
improvement projects. As a result, $964,110 in unsupported street repaving costs, and $364,544 
in unsupported curb and sidewalk replacement costs were charged to the CDBG-R program. In 
addition $213,331 in unsupported street repaving costs were charged to the fiscal year 2010 
CDBG program.
Inadequate Procurement of 
Capital Improvement Contracts
Upon notification from HUD of the availability of supplemental CDBG-R funds, 
City officials prepared a substantial amendment to their 2008-2009 annual action 
plan. This document indicated to HUD the activities on which the City intended 
to expend its CDBG-R funds. City officials identified seven activities, and HUD 
approved the substantial amendment on August 14, 2009. Two activities 
pertaining to capital improvement projects, which comprised approximately 35 
percent of the City’s CDBG-R funding, were examined during the audit. One of 
the activities was for citywide street repaving for an initial contract amount of 
$878,268, and the other was for a curb and sidewalk replacement project for a 
contract amount of $431,117 in the City’s neighborhood revitalization strategy 
area.
Based on correspondence and interviews with City personnel, the City’s 
Department of Public Works was given procurement responsibility for the 
CDBG- and CDBG-R-fimded capital improvement projects to achieve better 
economies of scale and avoid duplication of work between the Buffalo Urban 
Renewal Agency and the Department. However, neither the Agency nor the 
Department prepared independent cost estimates for the street repaving contract 
or the cmb and sidewalk replacement contract. As a result, there was no
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assurance that these contracts were procured in an efficient and economical 
manner that was beneficial to the City. Regulations at 24 CFR (Code of Federal 
Regulations) 85.36 provide that grantees must make independent estimates before 
receiving bids and perform a cost or price analysis in connection with every 
procurement action, including contract modifications; however, this was not done.
hi addition, regarding the initial $878,268 contract executed for the street 
repaving work, an additional $510,062 (consisting of $213,331 in fiscal year 2010 
CDBG funds and $296,731 in City operating funds) was paid for contract 
modifications not procured in accordance with regulations at 24 CFR 85.36, 
which provide that grantees must perform a cost or price analysis in connection 
with every procurement action, including contract modifications. The two change 
orders, which increased the original contract by 58 percent, were not supported by 
cost or price analyses to justify cost reasonableness of the contract modifications.
Further, the contract terms for the street repaving work noted that the project 
would be completed within 180 days of the notice to proceed date of June 16, 
2010; however, as of July 31, 2011, the contract remained open, and City officials 
had paid more than $1.5 million (consisting of $964,110 in unsupported CDBG-R 
fimds, $213,331 in unsupported fiscal year 2010 CDBG funds, and $403,638 in 
City operating fluids) to the contractor, with an additional $92,815 owed through 
contract completion. The amounts paid were well above the contracted amount, 
which indicated that City officials did not have controls in place to prevent 
making payments over and above those contracted. As a result, the $964,110 in 
CDBG-R and $213,331 in fiscal year 2010 CDBG funds was questioned because 
City officials did not prepare independent cost or price estimates to ensure that the 
price paid for the repaving seivices was reasonable or maintain controls to ensiue 
that only contr acted amounts were paid. If HUD determines that the contract was 
not reasonable, the $92,815 in additional funds allocated for this activity should 
be reprogrammed to other eligible activities.
Regarding the curb and sidewalk replacement contract of $431,117, expenditures 
totaled $364,544 and were considered unsupported for the same reasons. 
Therefore, the remaining $66,573 in contingency, retention, and unobligated 
contract fluids should be reprogrammed for other eligible puiposes and put to 
better use.
Inadequate Contract Oversight
The Buffalo Urban Renewal Agency did not oversee the day-to-day operations of 
the contractors selected to perform the two capital improvement projects. 
Regulations at 24 CFR 570.501 provide that an entity designated to undertake 
CDBG gr ant administr ation responsibilities is subject to the requirements 
applicable to subrecipients. These requirements include the regulations at 24 CFR 
85.40, which require monitoring of the day-to-day activities of the designated
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entity. Thus, while HUD regulations allow City officials to hand over the 
procurement function for CDBG-R-funded capital improvement projects to the 
City’s Department of Public Works, Agency and City officials are subject to the 
same requirements as a subrecipient. Agency personnel did not monitor or 
perform inspections, verify materials and quantities used, or track the progress of 
the work being performed onsite by the contractors. Although Agency and City 
officials relied on the Department of Public Works for this oversight, there was no 
assurance that Department officials had adequate knowledge of HUD regulations 
to protect the CDBG-R funds. As a result, Agency and City officials could not 
assure HUD that only necessary, eligible costs were charged to the CDBG-R 
program.
Conclusion
City officials charged questionable street repaving and curb and sidewalk 
replacement contract expenditures to the City’s supplemental CDBG-R program. 
Further, the City’s administrator, the Buffalo Urban Renewal Agency, did not 
oversee the day-to-day operations of the contractors selected to perform the 
capital improvement projects. Deficiencies identified included the lack of 
independent cost estimates for sealed bid contracts, no cost or price analyses for 
modifications to the street repaving contract, and no controls to ensure that only 
contracted amounts were paid. Consequently, there was no assurance that only 
necessary and reasonable costs were charged to the CDBG-R program.
We attribute these deficiencies to the lack of knowledge of HUD regulations by 
Department of Public Works staff responsible for the procurement of CDBG-R- 
fimded capital improvement projects and the Buffalo Urban Renewal Agency’s 
procedures, which did not require its personnel to perform contract oversight for 
CDBG-R-funded capital improvement projects. As a result, more than $1.3 
million, consisting of $964,110 in unsupported street repaving costs and $364,544 
in unsupported curb and sidewalk replacement costs, was charged to the CDBG-R 
program. An additional $213,331 in unsupported street repaving costs was also 
charged to the fiscal year 2010 CDBG program. The remaining $159,388, 
consisting of $92,815 in obligated funds pertaining to the street repaving contract 
and $66,573 in contingency and unobligated funds pertaining to the curb and 
sidewalk replacement contract, should be reprogrammed for other eligible 
purposes and put to better use.
Recommendations
We recommend that the Director of HUD’s Buffalo Office of Community 
Planning and Development instruct City officials to
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1 A. Suspend incurring costs for CDBG-R capital improvement projects imtil 
HUD determines whether City officials have the capacity to carry out 
these activities in compliance with HUD regulations. If it is determined 
that City officials lack that capacity, the remaining $159,388 ($92,815 and 
$66,573) in obligated and unobligated street repavement and curb and 
sidewalk replacement project funds should be reprogrammed so that City 
officials can assure HUD that these funds will be put to better use.
IB. Provide documentation to justify the reasonableness of $ 1,328,654 in 
unsupported street improvement costs ($964,110 in street repaving costs 
and $364,544 in curb and sidewalk replacement costs) charged to the 
CDBG-R program so that HUD can make an eligibility determination. 
Any unsupported costs deteimined to be ineligible should be reimbursed 
from non-Federal funds.
IC. Provide documentation to justify $213,331 in unsupported street repaving 
costs charged to the fiscal year 2010 CDBG program so that HUD can 
make an eligibility determination. Any unsupported costs determined to 
be ineligible should be reimbursed from non-Federal fluids.
ID. Establish and implement policies and procedures to ensure that the 
procurement responsibilities of CDBG- and CDBG-R-funded projects are 
adequately defined.
IE. Establish and implement policies and procedures to ensure proper 
monitoring of CDBG- and CDBG-R-funded projects, including the day- 
to-day oversight, reconciliation, and certification of contractor material 
use, cost sheets, and contract registers, to ensure that only contracted 
amounts are expended.
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Finding 2: City Officials Failed To Administer Their Emergency
Housing Rehabilitation Loan Program in Accordance With 
Their Own Procedures and Subcontractor Agreement
City officials failed to administer their emergency housing rehabilitation loan program in 
accordance with their own procedures and subcontractor agreement. Specifically, they made 
payments to contractors without monitoring and inspecting repair work, made payments for 
repairs that lacked the appropriate documentation to support adequate classification as an 
emergency, and failed to ensure that their subcontractor maintained a clear separation of duties in 
the administration of the program. These deficiencies can be attributed to City officials’ 
inadequate implementation of controls and lack of oversight of program expenditures. As a 
result, it is questionable whether $249,312 in completed repair work, as part of the emergency 
rehabilitation loan program, was for eligible CDBG-R program expenditures.
Background
The primary purpose of the City’s emergency housing rehabilitation loan program 
is to provide low- and moderate- income homeowners partially forgivable, no 
interest loans for emergency repairs on single or multiunit residences. Eligible 
emergency repairs include those to specific house systems that are in poor or 
dangerous condition.
City officials subcontracted with Belmont Shelter Corp., through the Buffalo 
Urban Renewal Agency, for the administration of the program. Belmont received 
applications for assistance from local community-based organizations and was 
responsible for the r epair process through the submission of a r equest for payment 
to City officials. This process included the verification of income eligibility, 
preparation of work specifications, requests for bids and review of those bids, and 
inspection of all work performed by the contractors. Regulations at 24 CFR 
570.501 provide that the recipient of CDBG fluids is responsible for ensuring that 
funds are used in accordance with all program requirements and that the use of 
subr ecipients or contractors does not relieve the recipient of this responsibility. 
Thus, City officials were responsible for ensuring that the program was 
administered efficiently and effectively. As of July 31, 2011, City officials had 
awarded 83 CDBG-R-flmded emergency housing rehabilitation loans with 
disbursements totaling $677,777.
City Officials’ Own Procedures
Not Always Followed
City officials did not always follow their own procedures in the administration of 
the emergency housing rehabilitation loan program. For example, they failed to 
inspect completed repairs, verify emergency conditions, and ensure a sufficient
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number of bids. Consequently, there was no assurance that the objective of the 
program was met.
According to the City’s procedures, all grant-funded construction projects must be 
inspected by a construction monitor upon completion. Monitors verify that 
completed work complies with all contractual obligations, including the approved 
specifications, before the issuance of payments to the contractor. Inspections 
were required at the time of periodic payment requests or at the time of 
completion. Also, all work items for which payment was requested must have 
been completed and in place.
However, a review of 20 emergency rehabilitation loan files found that payments 
were made to contractors without the prior inspection and approval of City 
officials. Specifically, four of the loans reviewed had final payments disbursed 
without the proper approval. Two of these loans also had prior partial payments 
for a total of $51,010 disbursed in six payments without approval. Further, 
although there were four additional emergency housing rehabilitation loans that 
each had one partial payment disbursed without the proper approval, the final 
payment requests for these four loans, which were significantly less than the 
partial payment requests, were signed and approved by the City’s monitor. 
Nevertheless, fluids were expended before City officials approved the repairs 
performed. Although the four properties relating to the partial payments were 
inspected later, the majority of the total payment was disbursed before the 
inspection. Thus, City officials could not provide HUD assurance that $51,010 in 
repairs completed without adequate monitoring hilly complied with the City’s 
procedures.
According to the City’s procedures, the intent of the emergency housing 
rehabilitation program was to address emergencies such as utility service 
interruption and the repair of specific house systems that were in poor or 
dangerous condition. The emergency verification form that must accompany the 
application for emergency assistance indicated the nature of the emergency. The 
procedures further added that conditions noted with each request for emergency 
assistance would be verified by a representative of the City’s Office of Strategic 
Planning.
However, a review of 20 emergency housing rehabilitation loan files foimd that 
neither Belmont nor City officials verified the emergency nature of $249,312 in 
completed repairs. Of the 20 files reviewed, 5 did not contain an emergency 
verification form, and the remaining 15 contained the emergency verification 
foim signed only by the homeowner and were missing the verification signature 
of the construction analyst. Therefore, no one attested to the emergency nature of 
the repairs requested for 5 properties, and only the homeowner attested to the 
emergency nature of the repairs requested for the other 15 properties. Thus, City 
officials could not provide HUD assurance that an additional $198,302 in 
completed repairs, which lacked evidence of proper certification, complied with
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the City’s procedures. In addition, there were roofing system repairs performed 
on 19 of the 20 properties reviewed, yet none of the loan files contained evidence 
that both significant deterioration and water infiltration, indicating an emergency, 
were verified as required by the City’s procedures.
According to the City’s procedures for its emergency housing rehabilitation loan 
program, all projects expected to exceed $1,999 must have a minimum of three 
bids from qualified sources. If an adequate number of bids is not received, efforts 
taken to ensure an open competition must be documented. However, of the 20 
emergency housing rehabilitation loan files reviewed, 9 files documented that 
only 2 bids were received for the work performed. The loan files contained 
handwritten documentation listing the contractors that were sent bid requests but 
did not contain adequate justification as to why the required three bids were not 
received. Therefore, City officials could not provide adequate assurance that the 
bidding on the repairs for nine properties was open and competitive.
Provisions of Subcontractor
Agreements Not Always
Followed
City officials did not always follow the provisions of their subcontractor 
agreement with Behnont regarding the administration of the emergency housing 
rehabilitation loan program. Specifically, City officials failed to ensure an 
adequate separation of duties and that bid review reports were completed as 
required by the subcontractor agreement. The agreement executed with Belmont 
provided that to maintain a clear separation of duties, bids were not to be 
reviewed by the same construction analyst who prepared the specifications. The 
agreement further required that to ensure the impartial review of contractor work, 
the construction analyst who conducted the job inspections for any single property 
would not be the same individual who prepared the specifications or reviewed the 
contractor bids for that property.
However, of the 20 loan files reviewed, 19 documented that the individual who 
prepared the work specifications performed the job inspections of the properties. 
Further, 8 of the 20 loan files reviewed contained a bid review report identifying 
the individual who performed the bid review as the individual who prepared the 
work specifications and performed the job inspections. The remaining 12 loan 
files did not contain a bid review report as required. Thus, there was not an 
adequate separation of duties at Belmont concerning the administration of this 
program. This lack of separation of duties further diminished City officials’ 
ability to assure HUD that Belmont performed the subcontracted tasks impartially 
and with integrity.
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City officials did not follow their own procedures and subcontractor agreement 
with Belmont for the administration of the emergency housing rehabilitation loan 
program. The deficiencies identified dining the review of the rehabilitation loan 
files are summarized in appendix C. These deficiencies make it questionable 
whether program objectives were met. Consequently, City officials expended 
$249,312 ($51,010 in repairs completed without adequate monitoring and 
$198,302 in repairs that lacked proper certifying documentation) for unsupported 
repair costs, thus diminishing the City’s ability to ensure that its emergency housing 
rehabilitation loan program was administered in an effective and efficient manner. 
We attribute these deficiencies to City officials’ inadequate implementation of 
controls and lack of oversight of program expenditures.
Conclusion
Recommendations
We recommend that the Director of HUD’s Buffalo Office of Community
Planning and Development instruct City officials to
2A. Provide documentation to justify $249,312 in unsupported repair- costs so
that HUD can make an eligibility determination. Any unsupported costs 
determined to be ineligible should be reimbursed from non-Federal funds.
2B. Revise and strengthen existing housing procedures to include that
emergency housing rehabilitation repairs must be inspected by the City’s 
monitor before all payments, partial and final.
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SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
We performed onsite audit work at the City’s offices in Buffalo City Hall, located in Buffalo, 
NY. between April and August 2011. The audit scope covered the period August 1, 2009. 
through March 31. 2011, and was extended as necessary. We relied in part on computer- 
processed data primarily for obtaining background information on the City's expenditure of 
CDBG-R funds. We performed a minimal level of testing and found the data to be adequate for 
our purposes.
To accomplish the objectives, we
• Reviewed relevant HUD regulations, guidebooks, and files.
• Interviewed HUD Office of Community Planning and Development officials to obtain an 
understanding of and identify HUD’s concerns with the City’s operations.
• Reviewed the City’s policies, procedures, and practices pertaining to its CDBG-R program.
• Inteiviewed key personnel responsible for the administration of the City’s CDBG-R 
program.
We selected a nonstatistical sample of transactions pertaining to public improvements and housing 
rehabilitation progr am activities. The City was awarded more than $4.3 million in CDBG-R 
binding in 2009. HUD’s Integrated Disbursement and Information System reports reflect that more 
than $2.78 million in CDBG-R funds had been disbursed for 88 different activities as of July 31, 
2011. These activities all fall under the seven broader activities defined in the substantial 
amendment to the 2008-09 annual action plan. The two progr am activities selected for testing 
represent more than 66 percent of the City’s CDBG-R funds budgeted. Therefore,
1. For the public improvements program area, we reviewed all expenditures occurring during the 
audit period.
2. For the housing rehabilitation program area, we reviewed 20 emergency housing 
rehabilitation loans that were expended during the audit period. These loans were selected to 
ensure that the sample consisted of loans awarded in the beginning, middle, and end of the 
audit period. The City had awar ded 83 CDBG-R-funded emergency housing rehabilitation 
loans with disbursements totaling $677,777 as of July 31, 2011.
The results of the testing apply only to the transactions reviewed and cannot be projected to the 
total population of CDBG-R transactions.
We conducted the audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perforin the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 
and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
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INTERNAL CONTROLS
Internal control is a process adopted by those charged with governance and management, 
designed to provide reasonable assurance about the achievement of the organization’s mission, 
goals, and objectives with regard to
• Effectiveness and efficiency of operations,
• Reliability of financial reporting, and
• Compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
Internal controls comprise the plans, policies, methods, and procedures used to meet the 
organization’s mission, goals, and objectives. Internal controls include the processes and 
procedures for planning, organizing, directing, and controlling progr am operations as well as the 
systems for measuring, reporting, and monitoring program performance.
Relevant Internal Controls
We determined that the following internal controls were relevant to our audit 
objectives:
• Effectiveness and efficiency of operations -  Policies and procedures that 
management has implemented to reasonably ensure that a progr am meets its 
objectives.
• Reliability of financial data -  Policies and procedures that management has 
implemented to reasonably ensur e that valid and reliable data are obtained, 
maintained, and fairly disclosed in reports.
• Compliance with applicable laws and regulations -  Policies and procedures 
that management has implemented to reasonably ensure that resource use is 
consistent with laws and regulations.
• Safeguar ding of resources -  Policies and procedures that management has 
implemented to reasonably ensure that resources ar e safeguarded against 
waste, loss, and misuse.
We assessed the relevant contr ols identified above.
A deficiency in internal contr ol exists when the design or operation of a control does 
not allow management or employees, in the normal course of performing their 
assigned functions, the reasonable opportunity to prevent, detect, or correct (1) 
impairments to effectiveness or efficiency of operations, (2) misstatements in 
financial or performance information, or (3) violations of laws and regulations on a 
timely basis.
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Significant Deficiencies
Based on our review, we believe that the following items are significant deficiencies:
• City officials did not have adequate controls over the efficiency and 
effectiveness of program operations when they did not estabhsh adequate 
administrative controls to ensure that costs associated with public 
improvement and housing rehabilitation activities were supported (see 
findings 1 and 2).
• City officials did not have adequate controls over compliance with laws and 
regulations when they did not always comply with HUD regulations while 
disbursing program funds (see findings 1 and 2).
• City officials did not have an adequate system to ensure that resources were 
properly safeguarded when they did not maintain adequate supporting 
documentation for costs charged to their public improvement and housing 
rehabilitation activities (see findings 1 and 2).
16
FOLLOW-UP ON PRIOR AUDITS
Audit Report Number 
2011-NY-1010
HUD OIG issued an audit report on April 15, 2011, relating to the City of 
Buffalo, NY’s CDBG program (201 1-NY-1010). Tlie audit foimd that the City 
did not always follow applicable HUD regulations in its administration of the CDBG 
program. In addition, the City did not ensure that CDBG fluids were expended for 
eligible activities that met a national objective of the program. The report contained 
3 findings and 12 recommendations. The findings involved the public facilities 
and improvements, economic development, and clearance program areas. As of 
December 2, 2011, 10 of the recommendations remained open and unresolved. 
Similar deficiencies were foimd during this audit, as discussed throughout the 
report. The 10 recommendations are listed below.
HUD OIG recommended that the Director of HUD’s Buffalo Office of Community 
Planning and Development
• Require the City to suspend incurring costs or reimbursing itself for costs paid 
from the City’s municipal general expense account for economic development 
activities imtil HUD determines whether the City has the capacity to cany out its 
CDBG economic development activities in compliance with HUD regulations.
If it is determined that the City lacks the capacity, the $4,739,829 in economic 
development project funds remaining for fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010 
should be reprogrammed so the City can assure HUD that these funds will be put 
to better use.
• Require the City to suspend incurring costs or reimbursing itself for costs paid 
from the City’s municipal general expense account for clean and seal activities 
until HUD determines whether the City lias the capacity to cany out its CDBG 
clean and seal activities in compliance with HUD regulations. If it is determined 
that the City lacks the capacity, $744,479 in fiscal year 2010 clean and seal 
progr am fluids should be reprogrammed so the City can assure HUD that these 
funds will be put to better use.
HUD OIG further recommended that the Director of HUD’s Buffalo Office of 
Community Planning and Development instruct the City to
• Reimburse from non-Federal funds $ 162,923 ($ 134,711 + $28,212) expended on 
ineligible costs pertaining to sheet improvement projects not done and a 
duplicate reimbursement.
• Provide documentation to justify the $ 1,982,988 in unsupported costs associated 
with sheet improvement expenditures incurred between June 2007 and October
17
2009. Aliy unsupported costs determined to be ineligible should be reimbursed 
from non-Federal funds.
• Provide documentation to justify the $20,143,219 ($4,902,754 + $15,240,465) in 
unsupported transactions recorded in the CDBG program income account. Any 
receipts determined to be unrecorded program income should be returned to the 
CDBG progr am, and any expenditures determined to be ineligible should be 
reimbursed from non-Federal fluids.
• Certify and provide support that the proper amount of CDBG assets pertaining to 
Buffalo Economic Renaissance Corporation program income was returned to the 
City fr om the subrecipient by performing an audit of the accounts that the 
Corporation maintained.
• Establish and implement controls that will ensure adequate monitoring of 
subrecipient-adininistered activities, that CDBG funds are properly safeguarded, 
the achievement of performance goals in subrecipient supported activities, and 
that collective actions are taken for nonperforming subrecipients.
• Reimburse fr om non-Federal fluids the $304,506 related to ineligible clean and 
seal code enforcement costs.
• Provide documentation to justify the $716,622 ($545,607 + $24,069 + $ 146,946) 
in unsupported clean and seal costs incurred so that HUD can make an eligibility 
determination. Any costs determined to be ineligible should be reimbursed from 
non-Federal fluids.
• Develop administrative control procedures that will ensure compliance with 
CDBG program requirements, including ensiuing that costs are eligible and 
necessary before being charged to the program.
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APPENDIXES
Appendix A
SCHEDULE OF QUESTIONED COSTS
AND FUNDS TO BE PUT TO BETTER USE
Recommendation Unsupported Fimds to be put
number 1/ to better use 2/
1A $159,388
IB $1,328,654
1C $213,331
2A $249,312
Total $1,791,297 $159,388
1/ Unsupported costs are those costs charged to a HUD-fmanced or HUD-insured program 
or activity when we cannot determine eligibility at the time of the audit. Unsupported 
costs require a decision by HUD program officials. This decision, in addition to 
obtaining supporting documentation, might involve a legal interpretation or clarification 
of departmental policies and procedures.
2/ Recommendations that fimds be put to better use are estimates of amounts that could be 
used more efficiently if an Office of Inspector General (OIG) recommendation is 
implemented. These amounts include reductions in outlays, deobligation of funds, 
withdrawal of interest, costs not inclined by implementing recommended improvements, 
avoidance of unnecessary expenditures noted in preaward reviews, and any other savings 
that are specifically identified. In this instance, if City officials implement our 
recommendations to reprogram the remaining $159,388 in obligated and unobligated 
street improvement project fimds, they can assure HUD that these fimds will be properly 
put to better use.
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Appendix B
AUDITEE COMMENTS AND OIG’S EVALUATION
Ref to OIG Evaluation Auditee Comments
Comment 1
Buffalo Urban Renewal Agency
920 City Hall. 65 Niagara Square 
Buffalo, New York 14202-3376 
716 851-5035
Byron W. Brown. Chairmar
November 15. 2011
Mr. fcdgnr Moore
Regional Inspector ( icneral for Audit*
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
Office of Inspector General 
26 Federal Plaza 
Room 3430
New York, NY 10278-006}!
Rc: Written Comments to Diaft Audit Kcpon 2OI2-NY-10XX
Dear Mr. Moore:
We appreciate the opportunity to review the Draft Audit Report with your stall during 
our exit conference on November 9.2011. Wc recognize that the Office of Inspector General 
(‘1)1(1") has reviewed a number of administrative matters and we huve certain concurrences and 
corrections As we understand the Draft Audit, there are essentially two Findings.
Finding I states that the Buffalo I 'rhan Renewal Agent) (*BURA*) did not oversee day- 
to-day operations of selected contractors and believes there were unsupported street pa'mg and 
curb and sidewalk replacement costs. We look forward to working with the program office to 
clear these findings.
We respectfully disagree with Dili. We can provide or provide again evidence of public 
procurement. We must note tlwl in our exit conference wc offered this and your office declined 
our offer. At the exit interview. OIG noted that these matters were addressed at the pre-exit 
conference, but we noted there was no pre-exit conference here. Tnstead, we received a short 
memorandum that, w hich did not address much of what was contained in live Di al! Audit. We 
also would like to note that wc requested a more organized communication between auditors and 
auditees. which wc informally requested in a prior audit, ami OIG again declined. As wc noted, 
Bl RA members believe they provided the information the OIG staff requested However, vve 
appreciate live oral representations made at the exit conference that the Findings were only based 
on the information OIG reviewed, ibut it does not mean die required information docs not exisi. 
and that we will have an opportunity to review dial in clearance with the program office
istTnss i
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Ref to OIG Evaluation Auditee Comments
Comment 2
Comment 3 
Comment 4 
Comment 5
Mr. Fdgar Moure 
November 15,2011 
Page 2
Construction was monitored by BURA's consultant Marquis Engineering. P.C. The 
report appeurs to characterize ‘‘day-to-day" oversight as in the nature of construction supervision, 
which we do not believe is correct. Regardless. 85.40 was complied w ith as day-to-day grant 
oversight was pros idol. I he Mnrquis Company was hired as an agent of the city to monitor, 
perforin inspections, verify materials and quantities used, and track the progress of the work 
being performed on site by the contractors We further do noi agree llial 24 CFR 85.36 requires 
procurement of contract m odifications, Wc understand that cost or price analysis was provided 
regarding eliange orders and contract modifications.
Finding 2 alleges questionable costs regarding completed repair work subcontracted 
through Belmont Shelter Corporation ("Belmont"The Belmont contract is renewed unJ revised 
over 18 month periods and includes provisions to ensure proper completion of eligible w ork We 
believe Bl JR A monitored completed repairs pursuant to its policies and procedures. We arc still 
reviewing the Appendix C. which our office has only recently received. Thus far, our reviews 
show that the listed loans were inspected, though in tine case (7460) the inspector signed on the 
wrong line We believe in other occasions there may have been confusion with your office as the 
format changed at the last contract renewal with regard to die bid review reports, lhese forms 
wvre changed by the IH.I) Field Office as a result of their monitoring review. We also believe 
there may have been a difference of understanding as to the importance of some forms. For 
example the ‘'emergency verification form” was not required because the construction analyst 
reviewed the emergency nature of the work in person prior to the preparation of the work 
specification. I he follow-up on the April 15. 2011 audit is your office's summary of that audit. 
Wc have timely responded to each program office request following the audit and arc working 
with the program office on their stated time line for resolution of that audit
On behalf of the Mayor of the City of Buffalo, thank you for this opportunity and request 
that you consider these written comments in any final report.
Enclosure
cc: The Honorable Byron W. Brown, Mayor, City of Buffalo
Brendan R Mehaffy. Vice Chairman. City of Buffalo, llrhan Renewal Agency 
Richard Price. Esq.. Nixon Peabody, LI P
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OIG Evaluation of Auditee Comments
Comment 1 Officials for the City disagree with finding 1, stating that they can provide
evidence of public procurement. Further, City officials contend that (1) a preexit 
conference was not held to address the issues identified in the draft report, (2) 
their request for more organized communication between the auditors was 
declined, and (3) the requested information was provided. Throughout the course 
of the audit, OIG requested all documentation pertaining to the procurement and 
monitoring of the capital improvement contracts under review. The conclusions 
reached are frilly supported by documentation requested and reviewed during the 
audit. Regarding the preexit conference, City officials opted to receive our 
written finding outlines in lieu of a face-to-face meeting, which we submitted to 
City officials on August 8, 2011. Since that time, City officials have not provided 
feedback or voiced their concerns. In addition, we accommodated the request for 
organized communication with the officials in the same manner as for the 
previous two audits to the extent feasible. The audit process allows us to formally 
request documentation through a point of contact unless it becomes tedious, time 
consuming, and an impediment to the audit. Requests for documentation were 
made through email correspondence and discussions with the appropriate City 
officials. City officials were given ample opportunity to provide the supporting 
documentation dining the audit. Supporting documentation provided after the 
audit will be reviewed as part of the audit resolution process with the local HUD 
office. Accordingly, the contention of the officials is unwarranted.
Comment 2 Officials for the City contend that the construction was monitored by the Buffalo 
Urban Renewal Agency’s consultant, an engineering firm hired by the City to 
monitor, perform inspections, verify materials and quantities used, and track the 
progress of the work being performed on site. Further, the officials disagree that 
regulations at 24 CFR 85.36 require the procurement of contract modifications. 
Nevertheless, in accordance with regulations at 24 CFR 85.40, it is the ultimate 
responsibility of the grantee (the Agency) to monitor the day-to-day operations of 
the contractor to ensure compliance with applicable Federal requirements and that 
performance goals are achieved. However, we were not provided adequate 
assurance that City officials complied with these regulations. Further, regulations 
at 24 CFR 85.36 clearly provide that a cost or price analysis is required in 
connection with every procurement action, including contract modifications. Yet 
at the time of our review, City officials could not provide the supporting 
documentation pertaining to the procurement and monitoring of the capital 
improvement contracts imder review. Thus, the contention of the officials is 
unwarranted.
Comment 3 Officials for the City state that the Belmont contract is renewed and revised over 
18-month periods and includes provisions to ensure proper completion of eligible 
work and that the Buffalo Urban Renewal Agency monitored and inspected the 
completed repairs pursuant to its policies and procedures. However, audit work 
found that the contract with Behnont was revised only once, in late 2010, and
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since the contract was originally executed in 2004, this is far greater than an 18- 
month period. In addition, the provisions to the contract to ensure proper 
completion of eligible work were not always followed. The City’s policies and 
procedures state that all work performed must be inspected by the monitor before 
final payment to the contractor. However the inspections that were to be 
performed by the Agency’s supervisor of building construction before final 
payment did not always occur.
Comment 4 City officials state that appendix C was recently received and still under review;
however, for loan number 7460, the inspector signed on the wrong line. The draft 
report, which included appendix C, was provided to the officials on November 2, 
2011; thus, the officials had ample opportunity to complete their review. Further, 
loan number 7460 had the signature of the lead hazard inspector on the wrong 
line, not Buffalo Urban Renewal Agency’s supervisor of building construction, 
who was in charge of inspecting the work performed upon completion. 
Nonetheless, the payment was processed by Agency officials, although the 
monitor’s approval signature line was blank.
Comment 5 Officials for the City commented that the bid review report forms were changed, 
which may have led to confusion, and that there may have been a difference of 
understanding as to the importance of some of the forms because the emergency 
verification form was not required. Regardless of its format, the lack of bid 
review reports further supported the lack of a separation of duties deficiency at 
Belmont. According to the contract, the Belmont official responsible for 
reviewing the bids should not be the individual who prepared the work 
specifications or performed the job inspection. The bid review report was the 
only document that identified the individual who reviewed the bids. Thus, for the 
loan files that were missing the form, the City did not ensure a separation of 
duties. In addition, according to the City’s procedures, the emergency verification 
form was required with all applications for assistance, and the conditions 
identified on them would be verified. Nevertheless, without the written 
attestation of an Agency or Belmont official, the City had no assurance as to the 
validity of the homeowners’ claims of emergency conditions. Therefore, the 
officials have no assurance that the emergency objective of the program was met.
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Appendix C
SCHEDULE OF EMERGENCY REHABILITATION 
LOAN ADMINISTRATION DEFICIENCIES
ID IS*
activity
num ber
R ehab loan  
am ount
Emergency rehabilitation loan administration deficiencies
L ack  o f  
m onitor  
approval 
-  final 
pm t
L ack  o f  
m onitor  
approval -  
partial pm t
L ack of  
em ergency  
verification  
form
L ack  of  
em ergency  
verification  
form  signature
Insufficient 
num ber o f  
bids
In adequate  
separation  
o f duties
L ack of  
bid
review
report
7446 $5,550 X X X
7447 $18,221 X X X
7458 $7,650 X X X
7459 $9,650 X X X
7460 $5,050 X X X X
7467 $11,550 X X X X
7475 $3,930 X X X X
7476 $14,730 X X X X
7477 $15,000 X X X
7519 $12,975 X X X
7531 $13,350 X X X X X
7555 $13,400 X X X X
7574 $16,800 X X X X
7576 $18,660 X X X X
7583 $15,225 X X X X
7612 $10,500 X X X X
7618 $14,188 X X X
7766 $14,458 X X X
7767 $14,500 X X X
7837 $13,925 X X
Total $249,312 4 6 5 15 9 19 12
* IDIS = HUD’s Integrated Disbursement and Information System
